Positive Political Theory
Do Juntas Lead to Personal Rule? (with Daron Acemoglu and Georgy Egorov), American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, May 2009
Dynamics and Stability of Coalitions, Constitutions, and Clubs (with Daron Acemoglu and Georgy Egorov)
Political Selection and Persistence of Bad Governments (with Daron Acemoglu and Georgy Egorov) Quarterly Journal of Economics, forthcoming
Why Resource-Poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data (with Georgy Egorov and Sergei Guriev) American Political Science Review, Vol. 103, No. 4, pp. 645-668, 2009.
The Killing Game: Reputation and Knowledge in Politics of Succession (with Georgy Egorov)
Dictators and Their Viziers: Endogenizing Loyalty vs. Competence Trade-off (with Georgy Egorov), Journal of European Economic Association, forthcoming
A Theory of Brinkmanship, Conflicts, and Commitments (with Michael Schwarz), Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 24 (1), 161-183, 2008.
Coalition Formation in Non-Democracies (with Daron Acemoglu and Georgy Egorov), Review of Economic Studies, 75 (4), 987-1009, 2008.
Adjusting the Median Citizen: An "Eliminations Model" of Stalin's Terror (Data From NKVD Archives) (with Paul Gregory and Philipp Shroeder)
Political Economics, Institutions, Russia
Dictators and Oligarchs: A Dynamic Theory of Contested Property Rights (with Sergei Guriev), Journal of Public Economics, 93 (1-2), 1-13, 2009.
Determinants of Expropriation in the Oil Sector: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data (with Sergei Guriev and Anton Kolotilin) Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, forthcoming
Businessman Candidates (with Scott Gehlbach and Ekatherina Zhuravskaya), American Journal of Political Science, 54 (3), 718-736, 2010.
Why the Rich May Favor Poor Protection of Property Rights, Journal of Comparative Economics, symposium issue on Appropriate Institutions for Growth (S.Djankov and A.Shleifer, guest editors), 31-4, 715-731, 2003.
Are Russian Commercial Courts Biased? Evidence from a Bankruptcy Law Transplant (with Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya), Journal of Comparative Economics, symposium issue on Courts and Judges (P.Spiller, guest editor), 35-2, 253-442, 2007.
Is Political Risk Company-Specific? The Market Side of the Yukos Affair (with Alexei Goriaev)
Provincial Protectionism, Journal of Comparative Economics, 38 (2), 111-122, 2010.
Passive Creditors (with Koen Schoors), International Finance, 8 (1), 57-86, 2005.
A Dynamic Model of the Research University (with Irina Khovanskaya and Maria Yudkevich), 2008
Theory and Applied Theory
The Variable Value Environment: Auctions and Actions (with Michael Schwarz)
Information Revelation and Efficiency in Auctions (with Anna Mikoucheva), Economics Letters, 83 (3), 277-284, June 2004.
Collusive Market-sharing and Corruption in Procurement (with Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky), Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 15, 4, 883-908, Winter 2006.
Equilibrium Refinement in Dynamic Voting Games (with Daron Acemoglu and Georgy Egorov), 2009